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cruise shipping 




Maritime terrorism is a neglected area of research in tourism, particularly the use of scenario planning to 
understand potential threats to the cruise industry. Since the events of 9/11, terrorism, and the threat of 
terrorism, has become a major concern within the tourism industry. This paper analyses tourist perception 
of perceived terrorist threats given that many ships are American owned.  Using the scenario analysis 
presented by Greenberg, Chalk, Willis, Khilko and Ortiz (2006), this study suggests that an attack on a 
cruise ship is a distinct possibility. Indeed, 44% of respondents questioned perceived the possibility of a 
terrorist attack on a cruise ship to be likely despite the fact that safety and security is seen by the industry 
as a ‘hallmark’ of cruising . Differences in attitude among potential passengers revealed a high level of 
confidence in the cruise ship companies. This finding is particularly marked among more experienced 
cruise ship passengers. However, this did not necessarily preclude the possibility of security measures 
being improved. All passengers appeared generally resigned to the fact that risk is associated with travel in 




The relationship between marine-based travel and tourism has a well-developed literature that 
encompasses both the role of passenger ferries in providing sea crossings for tourist travel (i.e. tourist 
travel as utility) and where the marine context is the focus of the tourist experience (i.e. cruising) (Page, 
2009). Within the marine transportation literature, the interconnection with the wider marine research 
agenda has seen only a limited development, particularly in terms of issues of traveller safety and security. 
Much of the research knowledge in this area emanates from travel medicine with the emphasis on 
traveller well-being and protection in confined areas where infectious diseases can spread rapidly, as 
evidenced by outbreaks of the norovirus. What is not particularly well articulated in the research literature 
is the interconnection with other cognate areas of research in political science (Quester, 1986) (i.e. 
terrorism) and two other aspects of management research (i.e. scenario planning and business continuity 
planning and resilience). These three areas are presented for the first time in the tourism literature to 
demonstrate the growing importance of potential tourist threats to cruise shipping to conceptualise and 
contextualise the issue in terms of the notion of maritime terrorism. The Council for Security Cooperation 
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describe maritime terrorism as ‘acts and activities within the maritime environment using or against 
vessels or fixed platforms at sea or in a port and liable to affect passenger or personnel, coastal facilities or 
settlements’ (cited in Greenberg et al, 2006: 84). This all-encompassing definition illustrates both the 
geographical scope of marine terrorism and the broad range of settings in which cruise ships and their 
passengers may potentially be targeted by terrorists.  Marine terrorism has largely been overlooked in 
existing syntheses of transport and tourism research (e.g. Page, 2009) although it is a germane area for 
research given the wider terrorist risks identified in marine environments by Greenberg et al (2006).   
This paper offers two innovative contributions to tourism research: first, one of the predominant research 
paradigms in current studies of tourism is the notion of the destination as the containing context for study 
(i.e. the destination as the study focus for tourism). Yet cruise ships by their very nature are not fixed at 
any one point in time and space to a specific form of infrastructure and so are highly mobile in a marine 
setting.  Yet as a mode of travel, it shares many of the safety and security debates that affect aviation post 
9/11. However, in the case of cruising, there is virtually no academic research focusing on tourists as 
potential victims outside of land-based destinations or in-transit via air-based modes of travel. Secondly, 
this study develops a strand of research emanating from a landmark study by the futures research 
organisation The Rand Corporation (Greenberg et al, 2006) that undertook a scenario planning exercise 
focused on maritime terrorism, in which cruising was one component. In this respect, these two 
contributions combined with a primary research study extending The Rand Corporation’s influential 
research provides an innovative focus for the analysis of tourist transport research in terms of maritime 
terrorism. This study also provides an analysis of cruise ships as terrorist targets from a consumer 
perspective which is comparatively rare in scenario planning research that tends to be supply-led and 
organisationally focused and does not normally undertake consumer assessments of the likely risks and 
scenarios occurring.   
The growing international interest in two inter-related dimensions of maritime terrorism - piracy  (see 
Birnie, 1987; Menefee, 1988 for a review) and the probability of terrorist attack and the loss of life through 
substantial collateral damage to a vessel has not been a focus for tourism research. For example, in 2011 
there were 439 acts of piracy, of which 275 occurred off the coast of Somalia although piracy is not 
normally associated with the terrorism agenda as the term hijacking is a more common usage even though 
it is little more than an issue of semantics. Safety issues surrounding cruising and the provision for 
passengers in emergency situations have also received an unfortunate growth in interest following the 
sinking of the cruise ship Costa Concordia in 2012 (Volo and Pardew, 2012).  Concerns have been raised 
about the safety of new generation large cruise ships given the debates in the literature about the highly 
unlikely probability of such an event occurring due to the construction of cruise ships with double hulls 
(Greenberg et al, 2006). Yet as the accident affecting this cruise ship suggests there are inherent 
vulnerabilities to cruise ships which accidents and potential terrorist attacks could pose to its passengers.  
When one draws comparisons with the tragic loss of life on board the Herald of Free Enterprise passenger 
ferry in 1987 at an insurance cost of US$110 million where 193 passengers died, this is comparatively small 
compared to the scale and number of passenger’s modern day cruise lines carry.  A passenger population 
of 2000 and 1000 crew is not uncommon with plans for cruise ships to carry 3000 passengers from 2015.  
Therefore, the increased size of the potential economic ‘loss’ through a terrorist attack is much greater 
along with the potential loss of life. This paper challenges the notion of the ‘safe’ cruise epitomised by 
Dowling (2006: 427) that ‘safety and security are a hallmark of cruising’, highlighting the greater 
understanding needed towards cruise ship vulnerability to terrorist attack through the contribution of 
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scenario planning and the response of consumers to such risks. The research reported in this study seeks to 
quantify and understand the extent to which cruise ship passengers understand safety and security risks as 
a traditionally risk averse clientele (Wilkes, Pendergast and Leggat 2006; Tarlow 2006a, b). The paper 
examines a number of interconnected literatures to provide a better understanding of marine terrorism 
and tourism, namely scenario planning to assess the scope, scale and risk of terrorist attack on cruise liners 
and the risk perception of tourists as travellers. However, prior to examining the literature, it is useful to 
provide an overview of cruise ships as floating destinations and their vulnerability to terrorist attack. 
 
2. The Cruise Shipping Industry: An Overview 
A growing academic literature is now developing on the emergence of cruising as a popular leisure activity 
(Cartwright and Baird, 1999; Douglas and Douglas, 2001; Quartermaine and Peter, 2006; Gibson, 2006a; 
Grace,2008; Holloway, Davidson and Humphreys 2009; Hannafin and Sarna, 2010; Ward, 2010; Mancini, 
2011). One strand of research in this literature relates to the role of marketing to reposition the activity as 
a product by reinventing itself not only as a means of transportation but rather as a ‘holiday experience’. 
From the 1960s, line voyages (or sailings between two points) came to be replaced by pre-arranged 
itineraries featuring multiple points of calls. Time at sea was to be filled with a heady mix of entertainment 
and gourmet dining, while port visitation allowed for the possibility of shore excursions, trips and visits. 
This has recalled the heydays of 1930s cruising as a luxury product and experience. Some researchers have 
argued that the Western focus of such a transformation in cruising to a luxury product epitomising 
conspicuous consumption has made it a legitimate target for terrorists. 
With changes in product and product positioning, cruise line companies have initiated changes in the 
market and corresponding ship design (Dale, 2005; Walker and Walker, 2011). Product development has 
seen the introduction of fly cruises whereby passengers fly out to meet their ship at the embarkation port; 
cruise and stay where passengers can lengthen their cruise by staying in a resort or city typically by their 
embarkation/disembarkation port; repositioning cruises featuring sailings at the start or end of a season 
when ships have to be repositioned for the forthcoming season; freighter cruising  featuring trips on cargo 
vessels; round the world, river and special interest cruises – the latter featuring cruises based around a 
specific theme or point of tourist interest, typically music sport health and fitness. 
Changes in cruise ship design has seen movement away from the ‘classic ships’ of the 1960s and 1970s to 
the modern ships of the 1980s and 1990s and what have termed ‘third generation ships’ of the new 
millennium (Mancini,2004; Ward, 2010) (see Table 1). 
Table 1 Comparisons in cruise ship design  
Classic Ships Modern Ships Third Generation Ships 
 Built from wood and natural 
materials. 
 Small public areas. 
 Hulls have deep drafts which 
make some ports inaccessible 
 Made from metal. 
 Large public areas. 
 Hulls have smaller drafts, 
thus ports are more 
accessible. 
 Ships measuring over 100,000 
tonnes are common place. 
 Mega ships catering for more 
than 2000 passengers. 
 Vibration less propulsion 
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and require tendering. 
 Small porthole sized windows. 
 Many staterooms have 
obstructed views. 
 Staterooms with balconies are 
rare. 
 Staterooms sizes typically large 
in size. 
 Promenade decks are 
common. 
 Can travel up to 30 knots. 
 Smaller swimming pools. 
 Typified by Royal Viking Lines 
Sky and Star (21,891 tonnes. 
Passenger Capacity 1,237 plus 
crew) 
 Larger windows 
 Fewer obstructed 
stateroom views. 
 Increased number of 
staterooms with a balcony. 
 Larger swimming pools. 
 More passenger facilities 
including casinos, theatres 
and discos. 
 Standardized stateroom 
size. 
 Easier pedestrian flow 
through ship. 
 Can travel between 20-25 
knots. 
 Typified by Carnival Cruise 
Lines’ Paradise and 
Sensation (70, 390 tonnes. 
Passenger Capacity 2,183 
plus crew) 
systems. 
 Innovative design including 
widening the hull and splitting 
the ship to have balconies 
facing both the sea and 
overlooking a promenade. 
 Freshwater swimming pools. 
 Increased dining options. 
 Increased facilities for 
children; cruising as a family 
experience. 
 Pioneering features, open air 
cinemas, shopping malls, spa, 
waterslides, zip lines, rock 
climbing walls, ice skating 
rinks, aqua- theatres, areas 
with grass and trees to name a 
few. 
 Typified by Royal Caribbean 
Internationals’ Oasis of the 
Seas and Allure of the Seas 
(222,900 tonnes. Passenger 
Capacity 5,400 plus crew) 
Source: Adapted from Mancini (2004) and Ward (2010) 
Cruising can no longer be regarded as an option for retirees and the rich (Keynote, 2008). The cruise 
shipping industry in the twenty-first century attempts to cater to all markets, budgets and geographical 
regions. Mancini (2011) reports that only 20% of cruise passengers are over sixty years of age dispelling the 
popular myth that cruising is an ‘old persons’ holiday. Indeed Gibson (2006b) reports the fastest growing 
market is in the 25-40 age group. As a result it has become increasingly difficult to define the ‘average’ 
cruise ship passenger (Mancini, 2011). 
In its effort to diversify its product, the cruise shipping industry has constantly searched for new 
geographical regions in which to cruise and new ports of call. Currently the world‘s largest and most 
popular routes are located in just seven regions of the world. These include the Caribbean, Mexico, Canada 
and the USA (including Alaska and the Panama Canal); The Far East and Pacific Islands, The Baltic, Europe, 
West Africa and the Atlantic Islands (including the Canaries and Azores) and the rest of the world 
(essentially the Middle East and Australasia)(Holloway et al, 2009). 
Itineraries sailing around the Caribbean have traditionally proved popular with the American market due to 
the close proximity of the islands to the United States. The emergence of Europe as an important cruise 
5 
 
destination reflected in Royal Caribbean International’s (RCI) decision to redeploy half of its fleet to Europe 
from North America for the 2011 summer season (Seaview Cruises). For experienced cruisers seeking new 
and exciting destinations Crystal Cruises reported the inclusion of Tripoli Libya to its Italian Splendour 
itineraries prior to the start of the civil war (Fearis, 2011). Elsewhere in 2010, RCI were the first cruise line 
to base a ship in the Middle East featuring seven night sailings around the United Arab Emirates. Luck, 
Maher and Stewart (2010) indicates that Antarctic cruises are becoming one of the fastest growing market 
sectors in cruise shipping with a capacity of just less than seven million bed days up from 4.2 million in 
2000. 
While the cruise shipping industry appears to be a highly competitive sector of the tourism industry 
featuring a range of companies, in reality the industry is dominated by just two core players (Ward 2010). 
Consolidation in the market has seen the industry dominated by Carnival Corporation PLC and Royal 
Caribbean Cruise Lines. Together the two companies have a combined market share of 78.4% of the world 
cruise market (Cruise Market Watch, 2010). Both have a number of brands in their product portfolio that 
ensure they are able to cater to a range of different markets and customer wants and needs as illustrated 
in Figure 1.  In the UK, the cruise market has seen consistent growth despite more constrained patterns of 
leisure spending, with passenger numbers from the Passenger Shipping Association recording a growth 
from 1.53 million trips a year in 2009 to 1.65 million in 2010 to 1.71 in 2011 with forecasts of further 
growth for 2012.  However these 2012 forecasts predate the Costa Concordia accident that led to an initial 
drop or delayed bookings in the peak booking month of January.  Nevertheless what these statistics show 
is that cruising in a UK context has been relatively resilient as an activity when airlines have been forced to 
cut capacity and even ground aircraft due to a drop in demand.   










With this growing commercialisation of the cruise industry, it is also pertinent to examine a parallel 
development in business and management studies – the rise of research on business continuity and 
resilience. This assumes an important position in cruising in view of the large fixed capital investment in 
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cruise lines and its perceived vulnerability post 9/11 as travellers and travel-related infrastructure became 
legitimate targets for terrorists. 
Research on business continuity is concerned with how businesses make plans for the possible effects of 
shock events or crises on their activities (such as a terrorist threat). An associated stream of research which 
is particularly relevant is scenario planning (Page,Yeoman, Munro, Connell and Walker, 2006; Page, 
Yeoman, Connell, and Greenwood, 2010). Scenario planning can be defined as ‘the process of trying to 
understand uncertainty associated with the future’ (Page et al, 2006: 647). It helps to create choices based 
on looking at alternative possibilities framed around three questions: what may happen (possible futures), 
what is likely to happen (probable futures) and what we would prefer to happen (preferable futures). In 
each case an attempt is made to ascertain how changes in (tourist) demand might shape the future. For 
example, in the UK VisitBritain has examined forecasts which identify that the number of people aged over 
65 will be greater than those aged under 16 by 2014. The implications for the tourism sector is that it will 
need to be attuned to the needs of this growing discerning and lucrative market, many of whom will have 
experiences of overseas travel. Scenario planning in tourism  has been used in situations as diverse as 
identifying the strategic response of national tourist organisations to a potential influenza pandemic (Page 
et al, 2006) through to transportation planning (Page, 2009; Page et al, 2010). In each case its use is to 
identify the range of risks and challenges which individual businesses and organisations may face. Page et 
al (2010: 101) notes ‘scenario planning is increasingly being used by organisations to consider the uncertain 
elements in the business environment to try to improve our foresight, to challenge our existing 
assumptions about how the world works’. It is one element of futures research (see Bradfield, Wright, 
Burt, Cairns, van der Heijden (2002) for more detail) and it performs two important functions: ‘risk 
management, where scenarios enable strategies and decisions to be tested against possible futures, while 
the other is creativity and sparking new ideas’ (Dunker and Greig, 2007: 210). Where such an approach is 
combined with consumer-oriented research , as illustrated by this paper, it has the potential to anticipate 
crises and foster the adaptive organisational learning required to develop new safety strategies as well as 
improving business resilience under conditions of crisis or emergency so as to improve organisational 
readiness for such events (Bradfield et al, 2005).Where such an approach is combined with consumer-
oriented research, as illustrated by this paper, it has the potential to anticipate crises and foster the 
adaptive organisational learning required to develop new safety strategies as well as improving business 
resilience under conditions of crisis or emergency so as to improve organisational readiness for such events 
(Bradfield et al, 2005). Most cruise ship companies have undertaken such exercises and have resilience 
measures in place in terms of potential threats but this is largely based on hypothetical futures and some 
understanding of past risks (i.e. the Rand Corporation database of previous maritime terrorist events was 
used to assess future risk by Greenberg et al, 2006). Therefore, this study is extremely relevant in the 
context of cruising as the scope of risks identified in the major study by The Rand Corporation (Greenberg 
et al, 2006) depicted the key vulnerabilities facing the cruise ship industry in relation to tourism, as 
outlined in Figure 2. These provide a basis upon which our study was able to assess the risk from a scenario 
planning perspective and then survey consumers about their understanding of the risks. 
 




Figure 2.  Key Scenarios Relating to Terrorism and Cruise Ships 




What Figure 2 illustrates is that large modern cruise ships are a potential target for terrorists when 
anchored off-shore or when passengers are embarking/departing alongside the publicly available 
itineraries which document their route. Greenberg et al’s (2006) scenario planning research has identified 
the previous extent of suicide bombings and terrorist attacks in an effort to identify the probability of 
specific risks from terrorism. Their study was based upon a combination of historical data regarding 
previous attacks, and on a series of interviews with counterterrorism experts. Information on threat and 
vulnerability were used to estimate relative risk in connection with various attack scenarios. Qualitative 
methods for generating risk estimates involved the use of defined ordinal scales to assess terrorists’ intents 
and capabilities, target vulnerabilities, and attack consequences. Greenberg’s principal findings were that 
the highest risk threats passengers were likely to encounter emanate from an on-board bomb, an IED 
attack or food/water contamination. Piracy and the risk of hijack were considered a much lower risk. Their 
study concludes that many perceptions of maritime terrorism risks do not necessarily align with the reality 
of threats and vulnerabilities. First, there is little evidence that terrorists and piracy syndicates are 
collaborating. The economic motivations for piracy (which depend for fulfilment on the stability of 
maritime trade) may be in direct conflict with the motivations of terrorists (i.e. in achieving maximum 
disruptive effects in connection with attacks). Second, some plausible forms of maritime terrorism (e.g., 
the sinking of a cargo ship in order to block a strategic lane of commerce) actually present a relatively low 
risk, in large part because the targeting of such attacks is inconsistent with the primary motivation for most 
terrorist groups (i.e. achieving maximum public attention through inflicted loss of life). Third, any effort to 
sink a cruise ship would need to overcome engineering designs intended to prevent catastrophic failure of 
a ship’s hull. Experts believe that improvised explosive devices would have limited capability to cause such 
failure (Greenberg et al 2006: 10). These technical and theoretical assumptions remain largely irrelevant to 
the customer who perceives there simply to be a risk.  Greenberg’s study also considers the concept of civil 
liability and how this creates the prospect that independent commercial defendants (i.e. cruise shipping 
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companies) will be held responsible for any damages caused by terrorist attacks. This gives a strong 
incentive for the private-sector prevention and mitigation efforts discussed in subsequent paragraphs. 
Yet a further recent development in the cruise market, most notably with cruise lines as venues for 
meetings and conferences (Ahmed, 2008) emphasised safety as one of the key selection criteria by 
meeting organisers. It is clear that the perception of potential conference organisers and cruise passengers 
is increasingly important as a workstream running alongside scenario planning research to assess the 
potential effects of terrorism on cruising. Yet the relationship between terrorism and tourist travel raises 
many conceptual issues to which attention now turns. 
 
3. Terrorism and Tourist Travel: Conceptual Issues. 
According to Henderson (2007: 68), terrorism is ‘the use of terror and violence by individuals or groups 
outside legitimate structures and processes to achieve desired ends which are usually political in nature’. 
Barker (2003) adds a moral dimension to this definition noting that terrorist acts using violence against 
civilians in pursuit of political ends are considered to be ‘morally wrong’ within societies in which they take 
place. Introducing a moral argument raises a curious dichotomy in any definition of terrorism and terrorist 
activity. Terrorists often have a deep seated belief that what they are doing is morally justified (Whittaker, 
2004). Differences in religious beliefs and social norms have all been used by terrorist groups to justify 
their course of action (i.e. they had no choice but to attack). Sonmez and Graefe (1998) regard this as 
somewhat of a cliché. Nanthanson (2010) has argued that because terrorists will always attack the 
innocent. Such an attack can never be considered to be morally right. Wilkinson (2006) agrees with this 
proposition, stating it is wrong to kill people for political ends without having political authority. Whittaker 
(2004), however, debates what is morally right and raises the question of whether terrorist activity could 
be seen as being morally justified if the consequences of such an attack are considered desirable. In doing 
so, this raises the deep philosophical question of what is desirable. There remains no definitive profile of a 
terrorist (Hogan, 2009). To attempt to construct such a profile would simplify a complex subject with a one 
size fits all approach. Gupta (2006) notes such a profile would invariably change according to group, 
country and culture.  
Enders and Sandler (2006) provide a range of examples of how terrorists make a political statement. 
Typically these include capturing hostages, bombings, assassinations, threats and hoaxes, suicide attacks, 
sabotage and chemical or biological attacks. Such techniques have been used by a vast range of terrorist 
groups around the world including separatist, ethnocentric, nationalist, revolutionary, political, social and 
religious groups (Terrorism Research, 2011). Since the beginning of mass tourism in the 1950s, tourists 
have become highly visible targets for terrorists. As a result, terrorism and the threat of terrorism have 
created problems for the tourism industry; namely a fear and reluctance to travel (Bauman, 2007; 
Mansfield and Pizam, 2006; Pizam and Fleischer, 2002). However, one significant change in terrorist 
activity is that tourists are no longer innocent bystanders to such attacks. The current trend is for terrorists 
to deliberately target and attack tourists (Swarbrooke and Horner, 2004). Tourists are often referred to as 
‘soft targets’ as they are easily identifiable, unarmed, vulnerable and in unfamiliar environments with 
foreign customs and language barriers (Kucukaltan, 2006). Sonmez and Graefe (1998) examine how 
tourists act as ambassadors for their country and, by attacking a tourist, a terrorist group is making a direct 
attack on that country. A terrorist attack can cause both disruptive and detrimental effects to a destination 
or mode of transport, especially if that country is dependent upon tourist spending (Tarlow, 2006a). Lepp 
and Gibson (2003) note that terrorists wishing to destroy a national economy will logically attack countries 
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that have tourism as one of their main exports. The tourism industry prospers in democratic and liberal 
environments making it sensitive and vulnerable to external shocks. Changes in the desirability, reputation 
and market perception of the tourist product, for example, a destination or mode of transport can all have 
a negative impact on a destination or product image and appeal (Niininen and Gatsou, 2007). The 
perishability of the tourism product only adds to the tourism sector’s vulnerability (Evans and Elphick, 
2005). In developing countries these problems are compounded in that they take much longer to recover 
from a terrorist attack lacking the resources required to repair infrastructure and tourist facilities.  Even a 
perceived risk of danger can be enough to prevent tourists from travelling to a destination or purchasing a 
particular product (Arana and Leon, 2008), such as a cruise holiday.  Terrorists recognise this and aim to 
create a sense of fear among the travelling public (Kucukaltan, 2006). Fear can be transmitted instantly via 
technology platforms including television and the internet and Tarlow (2006a) notes the careful 
manipulation of the media as a key terrorist trait. 
The defining terrorist attack of the twenty first century was September 11th 2001. Smith (2005) reports 
that this was the first hostile attack on mainland America by a foreign adversary since 1912 with many 
believing that it was an attack on American values. The events of that day altered people’s perception of 
the measures terrorists would go to fight their cause (Nieder and Enos, 2002). Subsequent rhetoric has 
seen 9/11 described as ‘the day that changed the world’ (Watson, 2009).  Historically, terrorist incidents 
involving the maritime industry have been rare (Lorenz 2007, with the exception of the long history of 
piracy. However, Goodrich (2010) points out that the events of September 11th 2001 demonstrated how 
tools for commerce and leisure can be used as potential terrorist weapons highlighting the possibility of an 
attack in the maritime domain. Greenberg et al (2006: 85) has articulated the attractiveness of striking at a 
cruise ship by stating that ‘there is the potential to kill large numbers of people and cause billions of dollars 
of economic damage as well as eliciting considerable media attention by attacking a highly visible symbolic 
target’. 
Lorenz and Gaouette (2007) highlight the various ways cruise ships could be targeted for terrorist attack, as 
discussed earlier in Figure 2. These include hijacking, sinking a ship using an explosive device, a standoff 
attack and a biological attack on the ships food or water supply. While undertaking such an attack would 
require terrorists to acquire complex maritime skills including navigation, piloting and ship handling, Lorenz 
and Gaouette argue that the precise scheduling of cruise ship timetables allow terrorists to be aware of 
where any ship is at any moment in time together with its next port of call.  Such information would assist 
the planning of any such attack. Bohn (2004) acknowledged that the last successful terrorist attack on a 
cruise ship was in 1985 when an Italian vessel the Achille Lauro was hijacked by a group of terrorists from 
the Palestine Liberation Organisation. Terrorist groups have shown interest in targeting the cruise shipping 
industry (Gaouette, 2010) as well as two maritime vessels including the US Navy ship USS Cole in 2000 and 
the French Oil Tanker MV Limburg in 2002.  As cruise shipping companies continually look to expand their 
destination portfolios it is inevitable that they will find themselves in more ‘hostile’ or dangerous shipping 
lanes (Koknar 2004). These include the Malacca Straits, Suez Canal and parts of Indonesia and East Africa. 
Piracy, a form of maritime terrorism, has proved to be a problem for cruise ships sailing off the coast of 
Somalia as evidenced by an attack on the vessel Seabourn Spirit in 2005.   In order to allay customer fears, 
the travel industry has made concerted attempts to improve passenger safety. In the aviation sector, 
governments moved quickly to restore consumer confidence by introducing a range of measures after 9/11 
including the installation of explosive detection equipment at airports the use of full body scanners and 
refining passenger profiling systems (see Figure 3).  
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Figure 3 International efforts aimed at improving aviation security. 
 
    Installation of explosive detection  
equipment at airports  
Full body scanners      Increase in the use of air marshals  
 
Refining passenger profiling systems     More passenger searches by hand  
 
Testing more baggage              Reinforce cockpit doors 
for trace explosives 
 
Improving security training for           Develop and testing of anti-aircraft 
airport staff             missile devices for commercial  
               
Improving airport security                Wider use of sniffer dogs  
at perimeter level   
 
Source: Adapted from Price and Forrest (2009)    
 
The 9/11 attacks highlighted the vulnerability of transport infrastructure to international terrorism. It also 
raised the awareness of a similar attack on the maritime industry (Vesky, 2008, Lorenz, 2007). In order to 
strengthen maritime security the International Maritime Organisation reviewed its International 
Convention of Safety of Life at Sea (1974, 1988) replacing it with a new International Ship and Port Security 
Code (2004). It has since been adopted by 108 countries and has helped to introduce uniform safety and 
security standards across the maritime industry (Tally, 2009). McNicholas (2008) notes all ships and ports 
are expected to provide: 
 Company/Port security officers responsible for assessing the vulnerability and threat to ships and 
ports. 
 Company/Port security plans. 
 Annual audits of ship and port security measures. 
 Staff training together with ship/port drills and exercises to be undertaken every three months. 
 A continuous synopsis record including a permanent record of the ships operations movements and 
ownership. 
 Ship security alert systems directed at informing land based authorities of any potential terrorist 
attacks, hijackings or acts of piracy. 
Given the increasing level of concern about terrorist attacks in tourism, it is also pertinent to consider the 
wider literature on risk perception as the principal area in which this research is located because the risk 
perception is what influences consumer behaviour and shapes the decision to book and take a cruise. 
 
4. Risk perception of terrorism by tourists 
How tourists perceive risk is an important determinant of how terrorism impacts upon international travel 





be affected by the risks associated with travel to a particular destination or region but the link between risk 
perception and international tourism is relatively unexplored (Lepp and Gibson, 2003). Santana (2003: 304) 
suggests that ‘perception is reality in the tourism industry’. This makes tourism extremely sensitive to 
perceived changes in risk and operating conditions. Laws et al (2007) concludes terrorism is one of the 
major risk factors that can affect the tourism industry alongside wars and political instability, health 
concerns, natural disasters and crime. Bourne (2010) and Cooper and Erfurt (2007) have argued that within 
these categories risk can be divided into high and low risk events. A natural disaster such as the Japanese 
earthquake and Tsunami of 2011 might be considered as being low risk as they occur relatively 
infrequently. However, as Pizam and Fleischer (2002) conclude it is the greater the frequency of terrorist 
attacks and not the level of severity that influences the extent of impact on tourist purchasing decisions. 
This might help to explain why destinations that have fallen victim to terrorism more than once are often 
slow to recover from such an event. (McKercher and Pine, 2004).  
Fuchs and Reichel (2004) provide evidence to suggest that when a consumer experiences risk they will 
adapt their purchasing behaviour in order to reduce risk to a ‘tolerable level’. It is not inconceivable that 
any attack on a cruise ship or even a perceived threat could warrant a change in consumer attitude and a 
movement away from this form of holiday travel. How risk is perceived will clearly differ from person to 
person (Cooper et al, 2008). Lepp and Gibson (2003) and Fuchs and Reichel (2004) have also shown that it 
can be influenced by personality attributes, demographics and past tourist experience. The influence of 
destination image has been studied by Avraham (2006) who has shown that persistent negative images can 
have a cumulative impact on tourist destinations ultimately leading to the decision to switch destinations. 
In contrast, Beirman (2003) has considered the impact of government travel advisories concluding that 
their influence on tourism demand is inconclusive. What the published research demonstrates is the 
importance of examining various scenarios of terrorist attacks in new tourism settings such as a cruise ship, 
illustrates the need to be look much wider than the conventional focus on aviation and land-based 
transport. 
5. Rationale for Research 
In relation to scenario planning, it is the extent to which tourists perceive there to be a terrorist threat in 
an uncertain future, as further evidenced by the safety concerns following the Costa Concordia sinking in 
2012, that highlights the wider concerns associated with the safety and security of visitors. This is a subject 
that has received relatively scant attention in the research literature (Watson, 2009). Research has largely 
focused on the impact of terrorism on tourist destinations (Dixon and Kaganoff Stern, 2004; Smith 2009; 
Mansfield and Pizam, 2006) and on individual sectors of the travel industry, particularly aviation (Page, 
2009; Price and Forrest, 2009). In contrast, this paper seeks to establish the extent to which cruise ship 
tourists perceive there to be a terrorist threat. It considers the consequences of any action on their 
purchasing behaviour and their image of the industry. These views are set alongside those of the cruise 
shipping industry and similarities and differences in perception are highlighted. Previous studies of tourist 
perception of risk (e.g. Laws and Prideaux, 2005) examine risk through primary research focused upon 
tourists as consumers so as to explore the complexities of their behaviour and this study is embedded in 
this approach to understand the implications of marine terrorism for cruise ship passengers and is 
informed by the scenario planning context developed by Greenberg et al (2006).    




To assess consumer risk and its relevance to consumer decision-making, this study undertook to focus 
on a range of stakeholders with interests in cruise tourism. Various data collection methods were 
considered to reach a target audience such as company client lists, web viewers of cruise reviews and 
other subscription/membership lists. It was recognised that access to actual cruise passengers was 
likely to be closely protected by cruise companies due to the sensitive nature of the topic. All the 
companies approached with a request for an interview, with the exception of one, declined to take part 
in the exercise. This is a common trait in studies of risk (Hoffman, 2006). Company contact lists 
including the International Cruise Shipping Directory proved useful in identifying possible 
representatives from companies to interview. Cruise ship reviews, such as those included in Cruise 
Industry News, provided useful secondary data to supplement and guide the collection of primary data. 
Subscription and membership lists taken from publications including Cruise Critic and Cruisejunkie 
were originally considered as a way of identifying a possible sample frame. This was subsequently  
rejected following concerns from the publishers as to the aims of the study. It was concluded the most 
convenient way of selecting a sample of potential cruise passengers was to target them at an event for 
cruise holidays at a major national venue. The aim of the survey was to examine themes identified in 
the scenario planning exercise by Greenberg et al (2006) and to frame the study in terms of the safety 
and security themes it raised. The focus on the UK, as a major source market for global cruise holidays 
was designed as an initial exploratory study which could be replicated in other worldwide locations at a 
later point in time. 
 
Data was collected by means of a standardised site or user questionnaire conducted on visitors to the 
London Olympia Exhibition Centre, the venue for CRUISE, a dedicated 2-day cruise shipping exhibition 
sponsored by the UK national newspaper The Daily Telegraph, on the 26th March 2011. The study used 
a single interviewer-completion methodology in order to increase response rates, ensure fuller and 
more complete answers and to allow the interviewer to respond to any problems of misinterpretation 
on behalf of respondents. By giving responsibility for the collection of information to one individual 
consistency of delivery style was assured. Since the first staging of the event in 2009, CRUISE has 
attracted over 17,000 visitors per annum, 67% of whom state that cruising is their main form of holiday 
(The Daily Telegraph, 2010). The exhibition consequently provided an excellent opportunity to survey a 
small sample of the UK public who had either cruised in the past or who were interested in cruising in 
the future 
 
In order to ascertain interviewee perceptions of terrorism and the terrorist threat, a combination of 
open-ended and closed questions were asked. Both sought to supplement existing secondary data and 
provide a new insight into customer perceptions of risk and the threat posed to cruise shipping. By 
adopting a face-to-face strategy for conducting research, immediate data information exchange was 
elicited and, where appropriate, the interviewer was able to get respondents to develop and clarify 
their answers  The questionnaire was sub-divided into three sections – cruise line security; the cruise 
shipping industry and terrorism; and customer experience of cruise shipping and the demographic 
profile of respondents. Questions on cruise line security sought to investigate customer perceptions of 
safety within the cruise shipping industry by asking a series of questions relating to current safety 
measures, security measures they would like to see in place, threats to cruise ships and risk, which was 
congruent with the study of risk by Greenberg et al (2006). Again, these questions were closely related 
to the issues raised by Greenberg et al (2006) in their scenario planning exercise, albeit in a supply 
context (i.e. cruise ship focused), whereas this study sought to validate the consumer perspective of a 
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future terrorist attack and its likely impact on visitor perception and potential behaviour change. The 
questionnaire sought to ascertain participant opinions on the likely threat of a terrorist attack on a 
cruise ship and whether any such attack would affect their image of cruising and their likelihood to 
purchase a cruise holiday. A series of demographic questions sought to establish whether perceptions 
were influenced by age and sex. Whether attitudes were determined by cruise ship experience was 
established by asking interviewees if they had previously undertaken a cruise. A variety of question 
styles were used in this study. These included the use of Likert scales designed to establish the extent 
to which respondents agreed or disagreed with a question or statement; numerical responses whereby 
respondents chose from various adjectives (for example low moderate and high risk); and checklists 
simply requiring respondents to choose from a predetermined list of answers. The advantage of all of 
these question types was that responses could be quantified. Where a supplementary non-elicited 
response was given this data was could be further used to clarify answers.  The questionnaire was 
piloted in the week prior to the Exhibition with twenty employees linked to a well-known travel 
wholesaler. This was done in order to identify any potential ambiguity in questionnaire design and test 
that the research questions and elicited responses were congruent with the aims of the study. Ten 
employees were randomly chosen for their cruise ship experience while ten were selected on the basis 
that they had never cruised before. This ensured that all questions could be understood by potential 
interviewees irrespective of their background experience of cruise shipping.  
 
The Exhibition allowed an excellent opportunity to question any individual with an interest or 
experience in cruise shipping in one specific place at one particular time. In total 144 responses were 
obtained from face-to-face interviews. This represented the maximum number that could be 
interviewed in a day and a sample size large enough for statistical inference. A non-probability 
sampling technique was used i.e. convenience sampling. Finn, Eliott-White and Walton (2000) note 
non-probability samples are common where individuals are interviewed at source such as a visitor 
attraction or special event. Zikmund (1997) and Brewster and Hunter (1989) maintain that it is possibly 
the most widely used sampling strategy and when used for exploratory purposes results can be quite 
valid. While probability sampling remains theoretically the preferred technique for reasons associated 
with precision and confidence (Veal, 2006) Finn et al (2000) do not preclude the use of various 
analytical techniques based on this sampling strategy. Indeed Dimmock (1999) concludes that with 
exploratory work which includes elements of a qualitative approach, and where there are limitations of 
time, cost and length, certain restrictions have to be imposed in the collection of data. As certain 
variables were regarded as central to the study (e.g. age, sex and whether the respondent had ever 
cruised before), an effort was made to survey equal numbers of males and females and experienced 
and inexperienced cruise passengers to capture a representative sample with these elements 
incorporated. These were selected from a variety of different predetermined age categories using 
Yarnal, Kersetter and Yen’s (2005) profile of typical cruise ship passengers. Stratifying data collection 
for the purpose of subsequent data analysis remains a technique widely used in market research 
(Brase, 2009). To further explore the issues identified in terms of cruise line security a qualitative 
approach was chosen focusing on a structured interview with a Director from a leading cruise ship 
operator. For public relations and legal reasons this person wished to remain anonymous. This method 
was chosen as Veal (2006: 199) notes ‘it can allow more sophisticated and detailed discussion of 
complex issues by probing more deeply than is possible with a questionnaire-based interview. Through 
sensitive questioning the interviewer can elicit credible, transferable and dependable results’. A series 
of carefully planned formal questions were prepared based on the existing literature and tourists’ 
perception of the terrorist threat outlined at CRUISE. The thirty minute interview conducted in May 
2011 centred on two lines of enquiry – the potential security threat to the cruise shipping industry 
posed by international terrorism and how any threat could affect the purchasing behaviour of the 
cruising pubic. In answering the former, the strategic response of cruise ship companies to minimising 
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the terrorist threat (the ISPS code) was addressed. In the case of the latter a series of guarded 
suggestions were offered as to the likely repercussions of any incident on the industry as a whole. 
 
7. Data Analysis and Findings 
Data was analysed using two methods. Quantitative data collected by means of a customer questionnaire 
conducted at CRUISE 2011 was analysed using statistical data software (SPSS 18.0). A variety of different 
descriptive and analytical techniques were used to interpret this data. These included the use of measures 
of central tendency (descriptive statistics); chi square analysis used to demonstrate the significance or 
strength of the relationship between two or more nominal variables and cross tabulations, designed to 
examine the association between dependent and independent variables based on frequencies (analytical 
statistics). Qualitative data, collected by means of an interview with a senior cruise shipping employee, was 
subject to content analysis. Content analysis involves detailed analysis of the content of a certain body of 
literature or other documentary source, such as in this case a transcript of an interview with a Director 
from a leading cruise shipping company. Here the text becomes the focus of research in its own right 
rather than merely being a report of the research. Data was analysed adapted from a methodology 
developed by Mathews (1987) and Stevens (1997). Here the transcript was read and trends noted in 
relation to the four basic questions outlined below. Reference to each category was noted in the text and 
inferences drawn from the results. Where possible findings were linked to primary and existing secondary 
research 
 
As noted in both instances the answer to four basic questions provided the framework for analysis: 
do customers perceive the cruising to be a safe and secure form of holiday travel? 
do they perceive there to be a risk of attack from an international terrorist group? 
should a terrorist incident happen on any cruise ship would this put them off purchasing the 
product? 
what can be done to minimise the threat and make cruising safer? 
 
Of the 144 questionnaires completed by visitors to CRUISE, 66 participants were male and 78 were female. 
Some 112 (or 78%) of participants had cruised before, with 40 (27.7%) having undertaken five or more 
cruise holidays. Respondents were generally well travelled with 54 (37.5 %) stating that they took three or 
more holidays per annum, which is indicative of more affluent travellers in a UK context 
7.1 Customer perceptions of safety and security on-board cruise ships 
Evans and Elphick (2005) and Page et al (2010) argue that the travel and tourism industry is highly 
susceptible to external shocks and the perishability of the tourism product can leave it vulnerable and 
exposed in a crisis illustrating the growing interest in emergency planning within the sector. Arguably one 
of the reasons for growth in the cruise shipping industry over the past two decades has been because it has 
been viewed by customers as a safe and low risk holiday option (Dowling, 2006). While certain tourist 
destinations and other transport modes have suffered from political instability, crime, war or acts of 
terrorism, cruise shipping has remained remarkably free from any such incidents (Lepp and Gibson, 2003). 
Questionnaire respondents were asked to what extent they agreed with Dowling’s (2006: 427) statement 
that ‘safety and security are a hallmark of cruising’ (Table 2). Nearly half of those questioned (70 
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individuals or 49%) said they ‘strongly agreed’. A further 46 (or 32%) stated that they ‘agreed’. In both 
instances 48 (or 33%) of respondents indicated that they had cruised before. 
Table 2. Perceptions of safety and security of cruising 
 
 To what extent do you agree with the following statement: “safety and 
security are a hallmark of cruising”? 
         Responses         Percentage 
Strongly agree 70 49% 
Agree 46 32% 
Neither agree nor disagree 22 15%  
Disagree 6 4% 
Strongly disagree 0 0% 
Total   144  100% 
 
     
The strength of the relationship between safety and security as a hallmark of cruising and cruise 
experience was tested by means of a chi-square analysis. This indicated that there was a relationship 
between cruise experience and perceptions of safety (X2=0.040, DF12, significant at the 5% level). The 
overall impression of potential cruise ship customers that cruising was a safe and secure activity were 
echoed by that of the Director of a leading cruise shipping company who stated that they ‘completely 
agreed’ with the statement and that the ‘safety and security of passengers and crew were the company’s 
ultimate concern and guided all operational decisions’.  Unlike the aviation sector, cruise shipping has not 
had to deal with any serious incidents involving terrorist activity or technical failure resulting in a serious 
loss of life. Ward (2010) reported that the cruise shipping industry enjoyed the best safety record with less 
than twenty fatalities in the last twenty years, although this has now increased due to recent events. 
Nevertheless, the repercussions of an event such as a terrorist attack could prove even more acute due to 
the rarity of such an incident.  After 9/11, a range of new security legislation was introduced across all 
sectors of the travel and tourism industry. The cruise shipping industry’s response was to introduce the 
ISPS code in 2004. Whether enhanced security legislation translates into cruise ship passengers feeling 
more secure was examined in the questionnaire survey (Table 3). 
 
Table 3: The relationship between cruise experience and perceptions of adequacy of security measures 
   
 Do you think the security measures cruise lines currently 
have in place are adequate? 
Yes No Don’t know Total 
Have you cruised before? Yes 86 8 18 112 
No 4 8 20 32 
Total 90 16 38 144 
 
The majority (90 or 63%) of questionnaire respondents stated that they thought that security measures 
were adequate. Only 16 (11%) considered they were not. The strength of the relationship between the 
level of cruise experience and customer perception of the adequacy of safety and security was again tested 
by means of a chi-square analysis. This illustrated a significant relationship (X2=0.218, DF2, significant at 
the 5% level) indicating the more a person had cruised the more likely they were to feel that safety and 
security measures were adequate, reflecting a confirmatory relationship often noted in the social 
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psychology literature where repeat travel builds a notion of security, often in a similar setting or 
destination. 
The survey then sought to establish whether tourist perceptions of cruise ship safety were age related. No 
significant relationship was found (X2=2.459, DF10, insignificant at the 5% level) (Table 4). A cruise ship 
holiday was perceived to be a safe and secure holiday irrespective of age. 
Table 4: The relationship between age and perceptions of adequacy of security measures  
 Do you think the security measures cruise lines currently 
have in place are adequate? 
Yes No Don’t know Total 
Age group Under 24 4 2 2 8 
25-34 16 6 14 36 
35-44 4 0 4 8 
45-54 16 4 4 24 
55-64 42 4 10 56 
Over 65 8 0 4 12 
Total 90 16 38 144 
 
The most frequent response was that security measures currently in place were adequate. This did not 
prevent respondents commenting on additional measures they would like to see in operation in the cruise 
sector (Table 5). The most common measure cited was the need to introduce ‘airline style’ full body 
scanners for passengers seeking to board a ship and improve the screening of potential cruise line 
employees. 




The use of sniffer dogs at ports  28 19% 
Searching more passengers by hand 8 6% 
The use of full body scanners  40 28% 
Improved security screening of cruise line employees 32 22% 
Enhanced passenger identification screening  26 18% 
More security guards onboard ships  10 7% 
Total  144 100% 
       
Technology and the use of full body scanners is currently being trialled or introduced across the aviation 
industry as a way of combating terrorism and preventing passengers smuggling illegal items onto aircraft. 
Currently it is a technology relatively underutilised in maritime security (Stratton, 2010). Criticisms of the 
technology have centred on the graphic nature of the images produced and the levels of radiation they 
emit (Warren, 2010; Mercola, 2011). Viable alternatives, such as introducing more security guards on ships 
and increasing the security presence, appear generally unpopular with passengers who see them as an 
Indicate one potential security measure you would most like to see in operation within the cruise 
shipping industry?  
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inappropriate intrusion and unappealing in a holiday environment within what is a confined space. The 
latter point was highlighted in interview with the Director of a cruise shipping company. It was noted they 
‘would resist any heightened procedures that impacted on the satisfaction of guests’. While the cruise 
shipping industry appears eager to promote the security measures and to comply with legislation that has 
been put in place post 2001, it is clear that there is potentially some element of conflict between making 
sure passengers are safe and feel safe and implementing a full range of security procedures. Gaps in 
security do exist and the full range of ISPS measures demanded in 2004 has not always been implemented 
for cost, image or technical reasons (Gaouette, 2010). 
7.2 The perceived threat of a terrorist attack against a cruise ship. 
Cruise ships have steadily increased in size over the past two decades (Ward, 2010). The result is that ships 
of over 100,000 gross tonnes are not uncommon. As ships have increased in size, so have security concerns 
(Greenberg et al, 2006). Gaouette (2010) acknowledges that cruise ships, in catering for large numbers of 
passengers in a confined space, makes them an ‘ideal’ terrorist target. Both Gaouette and Greenberg note 
that any attack on the cruise shipping industry could be seen as a symbolic attack on the West as the 
largest cruise ship companies are American owned with cruise holidays typically being taken by Western 
tourists (even though the ownership is not always reflected in where they are registered).  But while the 
ownership illustrates the iconic nature of cruise ships as symbols of conspicuous consumption, reminiscent 
of the age of cruising in the 1930s when this was the most luxurious mode of travel, the imagery now being 
promoted by cruise ship companies is highlighting a return to this luxury notion.   
Henderson (2007) observes that the cruise shipping industry is vulnerable to many external threats, all of 
which can affect its operational efficiency. Foremost amongst these threats are political instability at port 
destinations, natural disasters and adverse weather conditions. However, visitors to CRUISE saw a 
potential terrorist attack as the major threat to cruise shipping companies (Figure 4).  In highlighting such a 
response, respondents identified with the work of Rubacky (2010) who concluded that today one of the 
greatest threat to passengers and ships comes from terrorism  






Respondents who identified a perceived terrorist threat were subsequently asked to identify the level of 
this threat by means of a likert scale question. This asked respondents to indicate on a scale between 
‘highly probable’ and ‘highly improbable’ the extent of this threat.  They were also asked to indicate the 
reasons for their response. Some 64 of the 144 questionnaire respondents (44%) considered an attack on a 
cruise ship as ‘probable’. In contrast, only 34 (23.5%) considered it to be ‘improbable’ or ‘highly 
improbable’. Despite having cruised before and being aware of safety procedures aboard cruise ships, the 
majority of respondents felt that an attack was ‘probable’ (48 or 33.3%) (Table 6).  
One might debate the extent to which a question that asks to what extent respondents perceive the threat 
of an attack on a cruise ship is deemed probable or improbable to be leading and potentially biasing 
responses. The question did however make the assumption that respondents were aware of the general 
high levels of security alert which the UK was experiencing at that time. Consequently, this was an issue 
that had been prominent in the media.  Respondents also had the opportunity to not complete the 
question or to assess the highly improbable nature of such an event if it was deemed to be leading.  If this 
question was unintentionally deemed to be misleading, the results certainly did not demonstrate a strong 
bias towards this being a major event that was going to occur.  The findings were supported by Tarlow’s 
(2006b) argument that tourists have now become familiar with travel destinations and tourist 
infrastructure being targeted by terrorists. With familiarity comes a resigned fatalism that, at some time, 
an attack on a destination or travel mode (such as a cruise ship) will become inevitable.   
Table 6 The perceived threat of a terrorist attack and cruise experience 











Have you cruised 
before? 
Yes 2 48 36 20 6 112 
No 0 16 8 6 2 32 
Total 2 64 44 26 8 144 
 
Questionnaire respondents were asked why they felt an attack on a cruise ship might be likely following up 
on the comments of those respondents who had noted the probable nature of such an event in the future. 
Figure 5 illustrates a number of these responses allowing for a free flow of comments. Respondent views 
were varied, but reflected perspectives outlined in the existing literature (Klein, 2002; Earnest,2003; 
Greenberg et al, 2006; Hall 2009) relating to probability and perceived risk as well as potential security 
weaknesses. 
 











The spokesperson for the cruise shipping industry recognised that there was a risk and that the threat of 
an attack on a cruise ship had increased in recent years. ‘Of course there is always a risk. We also live in an 
increasingly unsafe world’. Perhaps not surprisingly the company represented was not prepared to accept 
any such attack on their ships as a possibility arguing that their terrorism mitigation measures were more 
than adequate to address any such eventuality:  
 ’Safety and security is paramount. I honestly believe our systems are second to none and can 
 guarantee a safe and secure cruising experience. Every time a guest or crew member gets on or off 
 a ship they pass through a number of stringent security checks. We use a sea pass card that has to 
 match completely with our computerised records. Behind the scenes bags are scanned and 
 passport details are matched to (US) security records. Onboard we have designated several people 
“Easy target, maximum 
press exposure”. “With the growth of 
terrorist attacks and 
pirate attacks it’s much 
more likely then 10 – 
15 years ago”. 
“Cruise ships are 
bigger better 
targets”. 
“Large group of civilians in a small 
place, it seems like the next logical 
step after all the pirate attacks”.  
“It’s a type of 
transport that 
hasn’t been hit yet”. 
“I have not seen an instance 
of an attack on a cruise ship 
but they do seem to provide 
a terrifying target”. 
“The security process is not very 
stringent. Security checks before you go 
onboard need to be improved. All we 
had to do is show a passport. Today that 
is not enough. Where were the scans”?  “Neutral – but I 
think it will happen 
one day”.   
“High profile, soft target, 
low security and outside 






 with responsibility for passenger safety. Let’s just say we have learnt from our colleagues in the 
 aviation industry here’.  
Whether such opinions represent bravado or can be interpreted as the ‘corporate view’ is open for debate. 
It seems almost impossible for any cruise shipping company to guarantee the safety and security of their 
passengers. While not being dismissive of the concerns of potential passengers, it is clear that the latter do 
perceive there to be a very real risk from terrorist attack, as a gap between the operational procedures and 
traveller perception exists. The issue is whether this gap will develop into a gulf and act as constraint on 
further growth in the cruise market. 
The CRUISE questionnaire sought to establish whether potential cruise ship passengers perceived there to 
be a greater risk travelling with particular cruise ship companies. Respondents were given a list of cruise 
ship operators and asked to identify which ones they thought were most at risk. Here the assumption was 
made that companies associated with the United States and its allies were seen as particularly vulnerable 
to attack. However, some 36 (or 25%) respondents felt no one particular cruise line was vulnerable. These 
were invariably individuals who regarded an attack on a cruise ship to be improbable or highly improbable. 
This was also a view shared by the Director of the leading cruise ship company interviewed as part of this 
research. The remaining respondents recognised there was a risk; in some cases to more than one cruise 
line. In addition, it is important to note that in relation to growing acts of piracy, the geographical zones in 
which shipping (especially cruise lines) has expanded from the coast of Somalia to the wider Indian Ocean 
and farther afield.    
7.3 Risk Perception and Customer Purchasing Decisions 
To assess the effect and impact of risk perception on consumer purchasing behaviour, respondents were 
asked to rate their perception of risk. This was a view expressed both by ‘experienced’ and ‘first time’ 
cruise passengers (Table 7). 
Table 7 Customer perception of the risk associated with taking a cruise holiday.  
 
 Perceived level of risk 
1 (Low) 2 (Medium) 3 (High) Total 
Have you cruised 
before? 
Yes 60 22 30 112 
No 12 16 4 32 
Total 72 38 34 144 
 
Given this perception, there is no reason to believe that potential risk has adversely affected the 
propensity of passengers to take cruises. However, previous experience has shown that a crisis, such as a 
terrorist attack, can result in a serious loss of confidence in safety and security measures adopted by the 
tourism industry culminating in a decline in visitor numbers and the consequent loss of tourist revenue 
(Laws and Prideaux, 2005). The survey data reported here would suggest that a similar attack on a cruise 
ship would have an identical response (Sonmez, Apostolopoulos and Tarlow, 1999). Nevertheless, 
passenger opinion was divided on this issue (Table 8). While 56 of the potential cruise passengers 
interviewed at CRUISE said that an attack on the cruise shipping industry would affect their decision to take 
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a cruise holiday; 54 said that it would not with 34 suggesting ‘maybe’. No significant differences were 
found in tourist perception between males and females on this issue. (X2= 1.85, DF2, Insignificant at the 
10% level).  
Table 8 The impact of a terrorist attack on customer purchasing decisions   
If the cruise shipping industry was subjected to a terrorist attack, would this affect your decision to take a 
cruise holiday? 
  Yes No Maybe Total 
GENDER Male 22 26 16 66 
 Female 34 28 16 78 
 Total 56 54 34 144 
 
Among potential cruise ship passengers expressing concern over an attack, the common strategic response 
was to suggest a decision either to cancel their holiday (47%) or defer their booking (53%). Among those 
passengers who suggested that they would probably defer any decision to book a cruise more than one 
third suggested that they would be prepared to wait up to one year before making any decision with 
another third suggesting such a decision would be deferred for at least a year (Figure 6) which is not 
dissimilar to other studies of the destination recovery cycle. 
Figure 6: The length of time potential passengers would refrain from booking/taking a cruise holiday 
following a terrorist attack   
         
 
Assuming that any attack on a cruise ship might be expected to result in a reduction in bookings in the 
cruise shipping industry, it was expected that any such incident and consequent decline in passenger 
confidence would be of concern to company strategists. In the course of this research, an interview with a 
Director of a leading cruise shipping company somewhat surprisingly revealed while they recognised such 
an incident  
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 ‘without doubt would be the worst thing that could happen to this industry; a year is a relatively 
 short time’. The respondent went on to state ‘companies such as ourselves could be considered to 
 be better protected from the potential repercussions of a terrorist attack due to our multinational 
 product portfolio. As an American company I believe our US shareholders would not ‘allow’ us to 
 fail as this would give terrorists a propaganda victory. Bankruptcy would also be undesirable for our 
 creditors due to the vast amounts of money involved. My personal view is that any downturn in the 
 market is more likely to affect small niche operators reliant on continuous cash flow. These 
 companies would also take longer to recover due to their small customer base and limited appeal’. 
Pizam and Fleischer (2002) have argued that it is the frequency of terrorist attack rather than the severity 
of any attack that has the greatest impact on tourist flows concluding that ‘tourist destinations can recover 
from even severe acts of terrorism, as long as terrorist attacks are not repeated’ (Pizam and Fleischer, 
2002: 337). It is debatable whether in the cruise shipping industry ‘one terrorist attack would be enough’ 
to severely dent consumer confidence, possibly to the point of no recovery for certain companies. Tally 
(2009) suggests that it could. Both Meikle (2010) and Thomson and Martin (2010) also draw comparisons 
with that of the Concorde crash of 2000. Some 113 fatalities left the reputation of the airline damaged to 
the extent that British Airways and Air France were both forced to suspend services in 2003.  
Given customer perception of risk and the likely impact of any terrorist related incident, the cruise shipping 
industry continues to pursue a policy of growth (Ruggero, 2011). Between May 2011-2012 sixteen ships 
were scheduled for launch adding a total of 39,995 passenger berths to current capacity. Any significant 
downturn in passenger numbers caused by a terrorist related incident could leave cruise shipping 
companies with excess capacity to fill. Such a situation would be compounded by the fact that cruise fares 
are often loss leaders with the majority of company profits coming from onboard expenditure (Klein, 
2005).  Despite growth in the European market, North America continues to be the cruise shipping 
industry’s largest source market. Were terrorists to strike the cruise shipping industry, how the American 
market reacts to the attack would have a fundamental impact on the industry overall recovery. As 
McKercher and Pine (2005:107) note recovery cannot begin after a crisis ‘until or unless the source 
markets begin to travel again’. Post 9/11 the propensity for Americans to travel internationally was 
significantly reduced. Many chose not to travel or avoided flying and Timothy (2010) commented on the 
wariness of Americans to travel outside the security of their homeland. Should an attack on an American 
cruise shipping company materialise, or such an attack take place in American territorial waters, it seems 
highly probable that this would be met by a reduction in the numbers of Americans either purchasing a 
cruising holiday or using maritime vessels as their principal transport mode.  
7.4 What can be done to minimise the threat and make cruise shipping safer? 
Potential cruise ship passengers interviewed at CRUISE 2011 were generally of the opinion that cruise ship 
safety and security procedures were adequate (Table 4) but highlighted a range of additional security 
measures that they would like to see introduced (Table 6). These were thought to increase confidence and 
reassure passengers that ‘safety and security are the hallmark of cruising’ (Table 3). Measures aimed at 
minimising risk can be grouped into two categories; portside initiatives and onboard strategies. Price and 
Forrest (2009) catalogue a range of measures that have been pioneered in the aviation industry aimed at 
reducing the risk of terrorist attack. The success of these measures is reflected in the absence of a major 
terrorist related incident on the ground or in the air since 9/11. Many of the initiatives discussed by Price 
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and Forrest have become standard operating practice at airports. These include the use of explosive 
detection equipment, sniffer dogs, body scanners, passenger profiling, body searches, luggage restrictions 
and controlled access to parts of airport for the non-travelling public. The introduction of comparable 
measures at dedicated cruise shipping terminals has been advocated by Stratton (2010) whilst the use of 
reinforced cockpit doors separating pilots from their passengers, improved security training for airline 
crews and even the use of security guards (Air Marshalls in the United States) has become de-rigeur on 
many airlines (Mercola, 2011).  Yet many of these measures to address the risk of terrorist attack do not 
easily translate across to the cruise shipping context.  This is because a significantly enhanced security 
presence aboard ships would generally be seen as unpopular with both passengers and cruise ship 
companies. Only 7% of those interviewed at CRUISE welcomed such an initiative. The representative from 
the cruise industry also commented their company would ‘resist any procedures that impacted on the 
satisfaction of guests’. A visible security presence was considered to be ‘generally unpopular and not 
appealing in a holiday environment’.  The cruise shipping industry is naturally eager to promote the 
security measures that have been put in place. However, the global nature of the industry presents 
logistical difficulties in making sure all safety legislation is enforced consistently in time and space.  
Anecdotal evidence (e.g. Gaouette, 2010) has highlighted major breaches of security including unplugged 
metal detectors, trucks with Arab licence plates parked adjacent to ships and failure to x-ray hand luggage 
and baggage.  
If cruise shipping companies are to reduce the terrorist threat and reassure their passengers there will be a 
need for them to introduce credible crisis management plans and adhere to the mandatory requirements 
for the security of ships and ports. The need for crisis management plans in the travel and tourism industry 
became evident following a series of terrorist attacks and cruise related health issues such as pandemic flu.  
Santana (2003) has sought to outline what a crisis management plan should entail which is part of the 
wider development of business continuity and emergency planning, equating this to a series of planning 
and training activities designed to understand, prevent and manage a potential crisis. Skinner and 
Mersham (2002) discuss the benefits to companies of undertaking such an exercise, noting that such plans 
can help in identifying possible crises, crisis prevention, reducing response time and limiting the financial 
costs associated with dealing with the crisis. Strafford, Yu and Kobina Armoo (2006) also believe that crisis 
management practices can limit negative publicity and in turn lessen damage to a country’s or company 
public image. Despite the obvious benefits of introducing crisis management plans, Sharpley (2005) 
maintains that they remain peripheral to the core activities of most company’s operations. Indeed, many 
such plans are reactive rather than proactive in that they are produced after the event (Sanatana, 2003; 
Sonmez et al, 1999). Where crisis management plans have been overlooked key staff and decision makers 
are left technically emotionally and psychologically unprepared (Sanatana, 2003). This in turn only 
increases the intensity of the crisis (Skinner and Mersham, 2002). The secret is to be prepared for all 
eventualities including events that have not previously been faced such as a possible attack on a cruise ship 
(Pforr and Hosie, 2007). 
This research indicated that one of the largest cruise shipping companies in the world had a crisis 
management plan and that they were prepared for a possible attack on one of their ships. In an interview 




 ‘Yes we have a crisis management plan. We would be foolish not to. At any one time we have 33 
 ships sailing around the world. Anything could happen. While we do not expect a major incident, 
 you must always plan for the worst case scenario - even a terrorist attack’.  
For security reasons the Director was reluctant to go into any detail on the nature of such a plan suffice to 
note that  
 ‘security and risk assessment is the responsibility of a dedicated team of individuals based in our 
 American head office. These people devise emergency situations and practice drills. They go on 
 continuously on our ships and in port. I am tempted to say 99% of our passengers are none the 
 wiser and we would wish to keep it this way. Suffice to say we would seek to reassure our 
 passengers that their safety and security is our ultimate priority’.  
Clearly this is only one response from an industry that remains highly secretive and protects commercially 
sensitive data from its competitors. As such it can be questioned as to whether this view is representative 
of all large cruise ship organisations. It does, however, indicate that such organisations are aware of the 
importance of crisis management and have detailed plans in place to prepare for such eventualities. 
The ultimate test of any cruise shipping company’s crisis management plan will be its ability to understand 
and to handle a crisis situation and be able to continue to operate and function during a crisis (Mitroff, 
2004). Mitroff (2004) considers their ability to handle such a crisis is linked to their organisational culture. 
Companies that survive crises are proactive and are prepared for such an eventuality. Such companies 
have identified the possible crisis; put in place risk assessment, understand damage containment and 
business recovery mechanisms; have established a crisis leadership team; and identified a range of 
stakeholders likely to be directly and indirectly involved in the execution of the plan. These activities would 
normally be expected to be introduced before, during and after any potential crisis.   While some cruise 
shipping companies have plans in place and are well prepared for any such eventuality both in terms of the 
execution of a plan and in terms of the consequences to their business of an event, the real test is when it 
is put into practice demonstrating if it is simple to implement and manage. However, while it is always 
possible to simulate a crisis, Faulkner (2001: 145) notes that ‘planning simulations do not always match the 
complex reality of everyday existence’. Whether all cruise shipping companies rigidly adhere to the 
mandatory requirements for the security of ships and ports appears more problematic. The International 
Maritime Organisation deemed it necessary to strengthen maritime security in a bid to lower the threat of 
a terrorist attack on its member’s facilities. Old codes were re-examined (the International Convention of 
Safety and Life at Sea 1974 & 1988) and were replaced in 2004 with the International Ship and Port 
Security Code (ISPSC). This has subsequently been adopted by 108 countries. The code is split into two 
parts. Part A provides the mandatory requirements for the security of ships and ports. Part B provides 
recommendations for implementation. The ISPS code applies to all ships on international voyages of more 
than 500 tonnes and the ports that cater to these ships. The code requires governments cruise lines, 
shipping companies and ports to detect and assess security threats and have in place plans designed to 
mitigate and respond to such threats.  
While recognising that there is a potential terrorist threat, albeit a small one (Figure 4), no potential cruise 
ship passengers visiting CRUISE mentioned the need for cruise shipping companies to fully implement the 
ISPS code. Indeed, no passing reference to any aspect of the code was mentioned at all and perhaps it is 
not realistic to expect passengers to be conversant with such a code. However, if passengers were aware 
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that cruise shipping companies were required to undertake regular audits of their security arrangements, 
they may respond in a different manner. It is clear that respondents do not recognise that cruise ship 
companies employ dedicated security officers with responsibility for assessing the security threat, while 
ships and ports are expected to produce detailed security plans outlining how they would respond to a 
crisis such as a terrorist attack, some of the anxiety expressed by respondents about potential risks while 
on a cruise might be overcome. This is all about communication and reassurance, a key feature of crisis 
management. 
Possibly of more concern is the general lack of awareness in the cruise shipping industry of the statutory 
duties required to be addressed in the ISPS code. The senior representative from the cruise shipping 
industry interviewed in this research was not able to comment on the code, nor identify anyone based in 
their European headquarters that could. However the respondent noted, ‘that’s the responsibility of a 
small team of individuals based in Miami. As such, it’s very difficult for me to comment on this. Very few 
people know the details of our security planning and I think its best kept that way’. Arguably passengers do 
have the right to know what cruise shipping companies are doing to reduce the risk of a possible terrorist 
threat. It also sends out a message to extremist groups that cruise shipping companies are not only taking 
the threat seriously, but are also prepared for any eventuality. Without such reassurances passengers may 
well feel anxious and concerned (see Table 6, Figure 5). It also strikes at the very heart of the assumption 
that safety and security are the hallmarks of cruising. 
Conclusion 
This study has shown that marine terrorism is a largely neglected theme in tourism research despite the 
growing significance of the global cruise shipping industry. Whilst the research by Greenberg et al (2006) 
has identified different attack scenarios for cruise ships, this research has extended the development of 
these scenarios to test the consumer perception of risk associated with these potential maritime terrorist 
events. While several potential types of risk can be identified, the greatest risk was thought to come from a 
terrorist attack on a ship or a port by an extremist group. The level of risk was thought to be low. This was 
because passengers had confidence in the safety and security measures adopted by the cruise ship 
companies. In fact, safety and security was seen as the ‘hallmark’ of cruising, an attitude expressed most 
frequently by experienced cruise ship passengers. While passengers appeared generally resigned to the 
fact that risk is associated with travel in the twenty first century, this did not necessarily mean that cruise 
shipping companies should ignore risk or play down the likelihood of an attack on one of their vessels. The 
survey indicated that passengers considered risk to be a serious issue to the point that they believed safety 
and security measures both aboard ships and in ports could and should be improved. The cruise shipping 
industry recognises that any attack on a vessel would have devastating consequences for their business. It 
would result in a reduction in passenger confidence culminating in a drop in bookings. The severity of such 
an impact would, in all probability, reflect the nature and scale of such an attack. Simultaneous attacks on 
several vessels would intensify concern and could cause passengers to cancel trips or delay the booking of 
a cruise holiday. For smaller cruise shipping companies the prospect of a major reduction in passenger 
revenues could bring the whole viability of their business operations into question.  
To what extent conclusions can be drawn from a relatively small sample size and an interview with only 
one (albeit a very senior member) of the cruise shipping industry is questionable. There is also no 
guarantee that should a similar exercise be replicated in other regions of the world similar perceptions 
26 
 
would be revealed. Nevertheless the evidence from the UK market is compelling. What passengers need is 
reassurance that their safety and security is being treated seriously.  This will require cruise shipping 
companies to maintain credible crisis management plans and adhere to the mandatory requirements for 
the security of ships and ports. While it is clear that many cruise shipping companies have made such 
provision, further work needs to be done to publicise their efforts. Business continuity and resilience 
planning requires organisations, such as the cruise ship companies, to not only constantly review their 
crisis plans but also to assess their own readiness for specific emergencies, a feature highlighted in the case 
of the Costa Concordia. Although this study has been exploratory in nature it has demonstrated a critical 
link between risk-terrorism and consumer behaviour and has identified the need for cruise shipping 
companies not only to understand their customers but also what can affect purchasing decisions. Here 
negative perceptions relating to risk can clearly influence the decision to purchase a cruise holiday and 
post crisis recovery. 
Further suggestions for research might explore specific aspects of risk and how they are perceived by 
customers together with the strategic response of cruise shipping companies to crises. This research 
provided some evidence to suggest that customer perception of risk is influenced by ship and by cruise 
line.  The suggestion that ‘mega-ships’, the high profile flagships of their parent companies, and cruise lines 
registered in North America were more vulnerable to attack is worthy of further investigation. This raises 
some interesting questions as to whether certain ships, companies and regions of the world are perceived 
by passengers to be ‘safer’ and if so could this offer certain competitive advantages to those companies 
and regions. Pforr and Hosie (2007) for example have been able to highlight how post 9/11 certain tourist 
destinations were able to capitalise on their geo-political distance from North America. While 44% of 
respondents felt an attack on a cruise ship was probable; 56% thought it to be unlikely. Research might 
explore the reasons for such confidence including perceived improvements in operational security 
measures. While this research has centred on one risk scenario presented by Greenberg et al (2006) others 
might be considered. Henderson (2007) recognises how cruise ships are vulnerable to other ‘external’ 
security threats. These might be considered to be equally important risk factors. It also seems reasonable 
to suggest that some of these, including political instability and prevailing weather conditions, might vary 
in relative importance around the globe. While this research has concentrated on customer perception 
towards cruise shipping, the perception of customers to the risks attached to visiting certain ports is almost 
totally ignored in the literature. It is, however, an area recognised by the industry itself and is reflected in 
the decision of companies such as RCCL to request a naval escort in visiting certain middle-eastern 
destinations and the ISPS code to include port installations. The limitations of the cruise shipping industry 
in being able to deal with a crisis was tragically highlighted in the events surrounding the sinking of the 
Costa Concordia in January 2012. The incident raised serious questions as to the ability of Costa Cruise lines 
to prepare, prevent, implement and manage such an event. The sinking of the Costa Concordia has 
identified the need within the cruise shipping industry to identify an effective crisis management model 
and examine to what extent such a model might be capable of being utilised. Here the work of Jacques 
(2007) might provide an initial framework for research analysis.  Despite maritime terrorism being a 
neglected area of research in tourism, the use of scenario research to understand potential threats to the 
cruise industry can and has been undertaken. Important conclusions can be drawn as to how potential 
customers perceive the threat to cruise shipping and given the risk what cruise ship operators might 
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